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WHO KILLED BRIGADIER MALLABY?
J. G. A. Parrott
About 8:30 P.M. on the night of Tuesday, October 30, 1945, near 
the Jembatan Merah (Red Bridge) in Surabaya, the Commander of the 49th 
Indian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier A. W, S. Mallaby, C.I.E., O.B.E., 
was shot to death.
It was, of course, not unusual for senior military officers to be 
killed during the Second World War and its aftermath, but the death of 
Brigadier Mallaby aroused world-wide interest. In fact an eminent 
Indonesian has described it as:
. . .  a disaster that decided the course of the history of Surabaya 
and also the course of our freedom struggle throughout Indonesia.1
In 1973 there appeared what is probably the most complete account 
so far of the affair from the Indonesian point of view.* 2 This series 
includes a detailed description of the prelude to the arrival of the 
Allied (British) forces in Surabaya, the failure of the negotiations 
leading to the outbreak of fighting between October 28 and 30, the 
killing of Mallaby on the evening of October 30 and the events that 
followed.
1. Extract from the seventh of a series of articles by Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani pub­
lished in the Surabaia Post between October 25 and November 9, 1973, with the 
general title "Seratus Hari di Surabaia yang menggemparkan Indonesia" (The Hun­
dred Days in Surabaya Which Shook Indonesia). These articles were kindly for­
warded to me by Dr. Doel Arnowo. They were recently republished in book form 
under the same title (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1974). I will use the book pagina­
tion in my citations.
Other versions of how Brigadier Mallaby died include: A. J. F. Doulton, The
Fighting Cock: Being the History of the 23rd Indian Division, 1942-47 (Aldershot: 
Gale and Poulden, 1951); L. H. 0. Pugh, "Soerabaja (NEI) 1945," Royal Artillery 
Journal, LXXV, 4 (1948), pp. 320-49; Pusat SBPI [Sarikat Buruh Pertjetakan Indo­
nesia?], Dokumentasi Pemuda: Sekitar Proklamasi Indonesia Merdeka (Jogjakarta: 
Badan Penerangan Pusat SBPI, 1948), p. 60; "Official Statement of the Surabaya 
Contact Bureau on the Death of Brigadier Mallaby," November 1, 1945, Indies Col­
lection of the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (IC-RVO), document no. 
056029; S. Woodbum Kirby, The War against Japan (5 vols.; London: H.M. Stationary 
Office, 1957-69), V, p. 324; David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1948), pp. 60-61; Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary De­
bates: Official Report (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1909- ); M. G. Abhyankar, 
Valour Enshrined, a History of the Mahratta Light Infantry 1768-1947 (New Delhi:
Orient Longman, 1971), p. 488; J.H.B., "Sailor in Sourabaya," Blackwoods Magazine, 
CCLX, 1570 (August 1946), pp. 73-84; "Report on Operations of 49 IND/INF/BDF, 
SOURABAJA 25 Oct-8 Nov 1945," from the papers of the late General E. C. Mansergh 
and kindly presented to me by the Royal Artillery Institution, London.
2. This is the Abdulgani series of "Surabaia Post" articles referred to in note 1. 
Abdulgani was himself a participant in the events described and much of his nar­
rative is in the nature of "eyewitness" reporting.
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By coincidence, I had also commenced a study of this episode and 
have recently come into possession of new evidence which differs in 
one or two important aspects from the Abdulgani version.3
It is the aim of this paper to investigate the circumstances of 
Brigadier Mallabyfs death in the light of the evidence at my disposal 
and hopefully to find the answers to the following questions:
1. Who gave the troops of "D" Coy, 6 Mahratta (who were in the 
Internatio Building) the order to fire on the crowd?4
2. Who killed Brigadier Mallaby?
3. Who, if anyone, was to blame for Brigadier Mallaby1s death?
Surabaya, August 20-Qctober 29, 1945
The Japanese capitulated on August 15, 1945, after the dropping 
of atomic bombs respectively on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki 
(August 9). However, between the date of the EmperorTs announcement 
of Japan1s acceptance of the Allies1 demand for unconditional surren­
der and the arrival of the first Allied (British) troops in Jakarta, 
there was a hiatus of 41 days. It is not within the scope of this 
paper to discuss fully the reasons for this delay, which was perhaps 
the most important single factor affecting everything that took place 
subsequently. But it is clear that during this six-week period the 
Indonesian revolutionary government was able to establish itself and 
gain an ascendancy over the Japanese occupation forces, a major part 
of which became thoroughly demoralized.
In Surabaya, news of the Proclamation of Independence was first 
heard on Saturday, August 18, over Radio Japan which had been taken 
over by pemuda groups.5 It was only on the next Monday that the full 
text of the Proklamasi Indonesia Merdeka was first published in the 
newspaper Soeara Asia.6
From August 22, 1945, onwards, various organizations in Surabaya, 
mostly led by pemuda elements, began--at first in a rather tentative 
manner--to take action to assert their newly proclaimed independence. 
This movement rapidly gained momentum until, by early October, the town 
was in the hands of the revolutionary movement and the Japanese rendered
3. This evidence comprises:
(a) A report compiled by Dr. R. C. Smith--formerly Captain R. C. Smith, 6th 
Battalion The Mahratta Regiment (6 Mahratta)--who was a liaison officer on Briga­
dier Mallabyfs staff; also two letters from Captain Smith elaborating points in 
his report.
(b) A letter from Major K. Venu Gopal who was, at the time of the incident, 
company commander of 'D* Company, 6 Mahratta, which was posted in the Internatio 
Bank Building in Surabaya.
4. The abbreviation "Coy" is used for the military subunit "Company" numbering 
approximately 120 men.
5. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 12.
6. It is interesting to note that in both the Proclamation of Independence and the 
August 20 issue of Soeara Asia, the year is shown as "2605"--in accordance with 
the Japanese calendar.
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completely impotent. In addition, a large amount of arms and ammuni­
tion was handed over by or seized from the Japanese and distributed 
among the population.7
The following "progress chart" gives, in outline, the sequence of 
events which culminated in Surabaya becoming virtually "an armed camp."8 910
Wednesday, August 22
Thursday, August 23 
Monday, August 27
Tuesday, August 28 
Monday, September 3 
Tuesday, September 11
Tuesday, September 11- 
Wednesday, September 19
Wednesday, September 19- 
mid-October: the siap 
period
Sunday, September 23
Instruction received from Jakarta to set up a Komite 
Nasional Indonesia (KNI) and a security organization 
called Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR).
Nightly blackout enforced by the Japanese cancelled.
Telegram received from Jakarta requesting that everyone 
fly the Sang Merah Putih (the flag of the Republic)--on 
August 29 and 30 to celebrate the first meeting in Jakarta 
of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP). Announce­
ment issued that the people of Surabaya would fly the flag 
from Wednesday, August 29 to Saturday, September 1. (This 
action is often referred to as the vlaggen-actie) .
KNI Surabaya formed--consisting of thirty-two members 
headed by Doel Arnowo.
The Japanese Surabaya Syuu became the Keresidenan Surabaya 
of the Indonesian republic.
Mass meeting at the Lapangan Tambaksari where the crowd 
was addressed by Soemarsono, head of Pemuda Republik Indo­
nesia (PRI), Resident Soedirman and Doel Arnowo.
Frequent clashes between pemuda and Dutch ex-internees who 
had walked out of the Japanese camps, culminating in the 
incident at the Yamato (Oranje) Hotel on September 19. A 
crowd of Indonesians hauled down the Dutch flag there and 
ran up the Sang Merah Putih. During a scuffle a Dutch law­
yer, Mr. Ploegman, was killed. He was the first of many 
Dutch and Eurasians to become victims of mob violence.8
Frequent clashes between Indonesians and Japanese and 
Dutch elements. Attacks on Japanese military and naval 
installations and the takeover of large stocks of arms, 
including tanks. Summary trials and executions in the 
Simpang Club. Manifestations of Mmob-ism.”*0
Attack on the Japanese Kenpeitai Headquarters (now the 
site of the Tugu Pahlawan). Surrender and handover of 
arms by Japanese navy at Gubeng.11
7. The weapons handed over were believed to be 200 guns, 690 heavy and 700 light 
machine-guns, 25,000 rifles, 1,240 tommy guns, 3,360 revolvers and large quanti­
ties of ammunition. Kirby, The War, p. 331, n. 2.
8. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1972), p. 154. See ibid., pp. 126-29, 155-66, for a description of
developments in Surabaya prior to the arrival of the 49 Brigade.
9. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 16. f,With the death of Mr. Ploegman, our people be­
gan to smell blood. We realized that from now on we faced two enemies, the 
Japanese army and the Dutch ex-internees."
10. Ibid., p. 23. ’’This mob-ism manifested itself in mob attacks not only on the 
Dutch, innocent women and children, but also on other nationalities.”
11. This is described in a copy of an account in Japanese by a staff officer of the 
Japanese navy kindly sent to me under arrangements made by Benedict R. O ’G.
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Friday, September 28 Arrival of Kapten Huijer (Royal Dutch Navy) ’’representing
the Allied Command.”
Monday-Friday, Further large-scale attacks on Japanese installations.
October 1-5
Saturday, October 6
Friday, October 12
Sunday and Monday, 
October 21 and 22
Kapten Huijer and team taken off a train (to Jakarta), 
placed under arrest and subsequently thrown into Kalisosok 
jail.12
Setting up of the Barisan Pemberontakan Rakjat Indonesia 
(BPRI) under Soetomo (Bung Tomo), whose nightly broadcasts 
over his own radio station (Radio Pemberontak) strongly 
influenced the people of East Java. Arrival of Soerjo, 
governor of East Java.
Mass meeting organized by the Nahdatul Ulama of Java and 
Madura.13
From about October 20 until the arrival of the Allied Force, there 
was an uneasy lull. At this time the city was described as ”a strong 
unified f o r t r e s s 14
The Arrival of 49th Indian Infantry Brigade and 
the Outbreak of Fighting (October 25-30, 1945)
By late October, the stage was set for the arrival of the Allied 
Force comprising the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade Group15 under the 
command of Brigadier Mallaby. (See Appendix for the Order of Battle 
and composition of this brigade group.) The 49 Brigade was a formation 
of the 23rd Indian Division commanded by Major-General Hawthorn, whose 
headquarters had been established in Batavia (Jakarta). The division 
had seen fighting in India and Burma during 1944, mainly in the Imphal 
area. It had not taken part in the subsequent XIV Army campaign which 
cleared the Japanese from Burma. During this campaign 23 Division was 
in training for its role in the proposed amphibious assault on Singa­
pore and Malaya planned for August 1945--code-named Zipper.16
Anderson. The narrative has been translated by Mrs. Willing of the Japanese De­
partment of Monash University. A significant aspect of this account is its close 
similarity to the Huijer report (P. J. G. Huijer, ’’Report on the Surabaja 
Affair,” IC-RVO, doc. no. 007177-007179). There has been a tendency among obser­
vers of this period to dismiss the Huijer report as unreliable because of its 
supposedly exaggerated pro-Dutch bias. In fact, most of the events described by„ 
Huijer are verified by this Japanese account.
12. Huijer, ’’Report”; Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 22.
13. Anderson, Java, p. 157.
14. ’’Besides that, the Angkatan Muda with its branches in each government agency- 
railways, electricity, radio, education, and others--were already active. There 
were also workers1 organizations with their militia; and the youth and militia
of the Surabaya ulama. All these plus the mothers and daughters who ran the pub­
lic kitchens and medical posts ensured that Surabaya at that time was a strong 
unified fortress.” Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 24. See also note 8 above.
15. The Force was termed a brigade group because, in addition to its normal brigade 
complement, it was accompanied by divisional troops, comprising a regiment of 
artillery and a transport column. For convenience, in this paper it will be re­
ferred to as 49 Brigade or abbreviated as 49 Bde.
Kirby, The War, p. 9.16.
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On the surrender of the Japanese, the operation went ahead as 
planned and on September 9, 1945, 23 Division landed on the beaches of 
Port Dickson on the west coast of Malaya. The troops of the division 
were welcomed as liberators by the majority of the population and an 
impressive victory parade was held in Seremban. Brigadier Mallaby and 
his 49 Brigade took their place in the march-past.
Brigadier Mallaby had been appointed to the command of the brigade 
during the final stages of its training in India. According to one of 
his contemporaries, he was "a highly intelligent, quiet, pleasant, u n ­
assuming officer.” 17 He had been a staff officer for most of the war, 
his last appointment being Director of Military Operations (DMO) at 
General Headquarters, India> in Delhi. In this capacity he had been 
one of Admiral Mountbatten*s chief advisers when he was appointed 
Supreme Allied Commander South East A sia.18 As DMO, he had been a 
major general, so he had dropped rank to take up the 49 Brigade appoint­
ment. He had not seen action with the brigade; in fact he had never 
previously held an operational command. It is, perhaps, one of the 
many tragedies of the Surabaya Affair that Mallaby*s first active ser­
vice command proved to be an unmitigated disaster.
The stay of 23 Division in Malaya was short-lived. Owing to the 
seriousness of the situation in Java, the division was soon ordered to 
sail to the Netherlands East Indies. The 49 Brigade embarked from Singa­
pore in the last week of September and on Thursday, October 25, arrived 
at Tanjung Perak, the port of Surabaya.19 * It was immediately clear 
that the brigade had not been properly briefed for its task. As Colonel 
Doulton put it, "Brigadier Mallaby stepped into a hornetrs nest u n ­
awares. . . ."20 This lack of effective intelligence regarding the
situation in Java could be traced back to the transfer of responsibil­
ity for the Netherlands East Indies from MacArthur’s South-West Pacific 
Area Command to Mountbatten1s South East Asia Command on August 15,
1945. In a much quoted extract from his Report, Mountbatten states:
Having taken over the NEI from the South-West Pacific Area without 
any Intelligence reports, I had been given no hint of the political 
situation which had arisen in Java. It was known of course, that an 
Indonesian Movement had been in existence before the war; and that 
it had been supported by prominent intellectuals, some of whom had 
suffered banishment for their participation in nationalist propa- 
ganda--but no information had been made available to me as to the 
fate of this movement under the Japanese occupation. Dr. H. J. van 
Mook, Lieut-Governor-General of the NEI who had come to Kandy on 1st 
September, had given me no reason to suppose that the reoccupation 
of Java would present any operational problem beyond that of rounding 
up the Japanese.21
Soon after landing, the brigade second-in-command made contact 
with the commander of the BKR, Dr. Moestopo, and the first of the many
17. Letter from Colonel A. J. F. Doulton, author of The Fighting Cock. Colonel 
Doulton was a senior officer on the staff of General Hawthorn at Headquarters 
23 Division in Batavia,
18. Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma, Report to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff by the Supreme Commander, South-East Asia, 1943-1945 (London: H.M. Sta­
tionary Office, 1969), Section A, paragraph 8.
19. Kirby, The War, p. 274. 20. Doulton in a 1973 letter to the author.
21. Mountbatten, Report, Section E, paragraph 37.
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conferences took place.22 To bring the reader without delay to the 
events of the afternoon and evening of October 30, the main events that 
followed are outlined in brief below:
Thursday, October 25 p.m.
Friday, October 26 a.m.
p .m.
Saturday, October 27 a.m.
Leading elements of 49 Brigade landed and seized the 
quay and wharves. First meeting between an Indonesian 
delegation headed by the second-in-command of the BKR, 
Dr. Sugiri, and the second-in-command of 49 Brigade, 
Colonel Pugh. Later that night Colonel Pugh was taken 
to meet Moestopo.
Brigadier Mallaby met the commander of the BKR, Dr. 
Moestopo, at the Ferwerda drawbridge. From there, they 
and their staffs drove through the town to the former 
British consulate building in Kayoon where they met the 
Indonesian governor of East Java, Soerjo. After much 
discussion the meeting broke up in a cordial atmosphere. 
One result was the setting up of administrative machin­
ery in the shape of a "Contact Bureau” under the joint 
chairmanship of Colonel Pugh and Doel Arnowo. Brigade 
headquarters was established near the Courts of Justice. 
That night, Moestopo was asked by the field security 
officer (Captain Shaw) to lead him and his section to 
the jail to rescue Huijer and his party, and members 
of RAPWI23 24who had been been imprisoned during most of 
October. Moestopo was unwilling, but when confronted 
by a platoon of Mahrattas, he finally consented with 
bad grace. This action was premature and ill-timed and 
did much to dispel the optimistic atmosphere that had 
been built earlier.
The situation took a dramatic turn for the worse as a 
result of a major error on the part of the Headquarters 
23 Division. A Dakota aircraft from Jakarta dropped 
leaflets on the town, ordering the Indonesians to sur­
render their arms.21* These demands inflamed the latent
22. For a detailed study of the involved negotiations between the Indonesian leaders 
and the British see my forthcoming ”The Role of 49th Indian Infantry Brigade in 
Surabaya, 25th October-10th November 1945.”
23. R.A.P.W.I. (Rehabilitation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees). This was 
the organization set up to succor ex-prisoners of war of the Japanese. Leading 
elements of RAPWI had parachuted into Surabaya in September 1945. The Indone­
sians, not without some foundation, considered RAPWI as a front organization for- 
the reintroduction of Dutch rule.
24. As part of the plan to occupy certain key areas, leaflets had been dropped in 
West and Central Java by the R.A.F., acting on orders from HQ Allied Land Forces 
South East Asia. The leaflets exhorted the population to remain calm and await 
the arrival of the Allied Forces. The leaflets dropped on Surabaya, however, 
presumably prepared on the orders of HQ 23 Division in Jakarta, were much more 
peremptory in tone. They gave the Indonesians 48 hours to surrender their arms 
or risk being shot, and called for the clearing of the harbor area. (At the 
time of writing, it has not been possible to obtain a copy of this Surabaya 
leaflet.) The result was that the tenuous agreement worked out between Moestopo 
and Mallaby was completely nullified. According to Pugh, Moestopo ”was frantic 
with emotion" and refused to believe that Mallaby was not responsible for the 
leaflet drop. Although Moestopo agreed to broadcast an explanation to the people 
that there was no intention on the part of the British to bring in Dutch troops, 
he had obviously lost trust in the British leadership and was no doubt concerned
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Sunday, October 28
Sunday-Monday, 
October 28-29
Monday, October 29
Tuesday, October 30
suspicions of the Indonesians that the British inten­
tion was to render them helpless before handing them 
over to the Dutch.
a.m. During the morning the British put up road blocks in 
order to commandeer civilian-owned motor vehicles.
Arms found in the vehicles were confiscated. These 
incidents, small in themselves, aggravated an already 
tense situation. By the afternoon the Indonesians had 
completed their preparations and at about 4:30 p.m. 
attacks were made in overwhelming force simultaneously 
upon isolated posts, units and individuals.25
The situation of 49 Brigade rapidly deteriorated until 
it was faced with possible extermination. Fears were 
also felt for the safety of the 6,000 internees, most 
of whom were concentrated in the Darmo area.
p.m. An urgent message was sent to Jakarta requesting the
intervention of Sukarno. He agreed to fly to Surabaya.
a.m. Sukarno arrived together with Hatta and Amir Sjari-
fuddin. After consultation with Brigadier Mallaby he
p.m. agreed to broadcast the terms of a truce. This calmed 
the situation. However, Radio Pemberontak continued 
to call for a renewal of fighting.
a.m. General Hawthorn, Commander 23 Division, arrived, and 
after a preliminary conference with Sukarno and Hatta, 
agreed to a meeting in the Government Building. The 
British were represented by Mallaby and Hawthorn, with 
a few staff officers; the Jakarta delegation consisted 
of Sukarno, Hatta and Sjarifuddin; the Surabaya group 
comprised Soedirman, Muhammed, Soerjo, Sungkono, Soe- 
tomo and pemuda leaders. After bitter argument and 
altercation a truce was agreed upon. The details were 
left to be worked out between Brigadier Mallaby and 
Indonesian officials. The Contact Bureau was to be 
resuscitated.
p.m. Assuming the danger to the Brigade was now over, General 
Hawthorn, together with Sukarno and his party, emplaned 
for Jakarta about 2 p.m.
One of the factors which did not seem to be appreciated by those 
outside Surabaya was the lack of control on the part of Indonesian
about the possible danger to himself in appearing to ’’support” British inten­
tions. As it happened, he did not broadcast. Instead there were inflammatory 
calls from Radio Surabaya for a general uprising.
25. Accounts differ as to the numbers of the forces engaged. Abdulgani (Seratus 
Hari, p. 32) gives the British forces as 6,000— certainly an overestimate. He 
does not give the strength of the Indonesian side. Wehl (The Birth of Indonesia, 
p. 55) estimates the Indonesian force at "20,000 armed and Japanese-trained regu­
lar troops supported by tanks and an uncontrolled mob of about 120,000 armed 
with rifles, swords and spears. . . . ” Anderson, who certainly cannot be re­
garded as an enthusiastic advocate of the British cause, puts the 49 Brigade 
strength at 4,000 which, he states, was attacked by an "estimated 120,000 pemu­
da” (Anderson, Java, p. 161). The Mansergh Report gives the estimated strength 
of the Indonesian forces as: "TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat), 15,000; Police,
800; Mob, 75,000 (armed with rifles, and 25,000 spearmen); with a further 5,000 
TKR available outside.” Whatever the figure, it is clear that troops of 49 
Brigade, most of whom were dispersed all over the city, were greatly outnumbered.
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leaders over their followers. As Pugh put it, MThey [the British High 
Command] accepted the assurances of Sukarno and other leaders without 
further question, little realising their inability to hold the fanati­
cal and excited masses.1’26
In fact, after the departure of Sukarno and Hawthorn, fighting 
flared up again and by 3:00 p.m. a particularly serious situation was 
building up around the Bank Building in the Internatio Square (see map on 
p. 109 below). Here ”D” Coy, 6 Mahratta was being hard pressed by 
hundreds of armed Indonesians who were demanding its surrender. The 
company commander, Major K. Venu Gopal, signaled to Brigade Headquar­
ters that he would have to return enemy fire. About 3:30 p.m., Briga­
dier Mallaby, whose belief--some might think in the prevailing situa­
tion^ a naive belief--in the genuine desire of the Indonesians to cease 
fighting remained unshaken, drove into the square. Carrying a white 
flag he walked alone across the square to the Bank Building and told 
Major Venu Gopal that all efforts were being made to implement the 
truce and ordered him not to fire unless actually assaulted. He then 
returned to Brigade Headquarters. However, hearing of another viola­
tion of the truce, he sent his brigade major and a Major Harte (who 
had come from Jakarta with Sukarno’s party) to protest to the Indone­
sian Headquarters some three hundred yards away. These two officers 
were arrested, and later seized and shot by the mob.27 At 4:00 p.m. 
yet another urgent signal was received from Major Venu Gopal that he 
was again being closely invested. Notwithstanding the fact* that his 
brigade major and Major Harte had not returned from their mission, 
Brigadier Mallaby decided once more to intervene personally. He p r e ­
pared to set out on his last journey.
The Killing of Brigadier Mallaby
The most complete accounts we have of the events that followed in 
the next few hours are, from the Indonesian point of view, that given 
by Abdulgani in his Surabaia Post series and, from the British point 
of view, the report of Captain R. C. Smith,28 with two supporting 
letters explaining specific points in it. Superimposed, as it were, 
on these two accounts is that of Major K. Venu Gopal who was at the 
’’receiving end” in Internatio Square. His story is vital in that it 
throws light on what happened inside the Bank Building just prior to 
the outbreak of shooting. To facilitate a comparative study of the 
vital period between approximately 4:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., relevant 
extracts from the Abdulgani and Smith versions are set out side by 
side according to time sequence. Where necessary I have added by own 
comments in parentheses.
26. Pugh, ’’Soerabaja,” p. 328.
27. Ibid., p. 339; Doulton, The Fighting Cock, p. 261.
28. Captain Smith submitted his first report on the death of Brigadier Mallaby the 
following day, October 31. In February 1946, however, he was ordered to pre­
pare a more detailed report in answer to the version of events given by Mr. Tom 
Driberg in the House of Commons (see p. 102 below). It is this second report 
which is quoted in this paper. It is interesting to note that the description 
given in Captain Smith’s first report of the Brigadier’s last moments differs 
in one significant detail from that contained in his second report (see note 
41).
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The Abdulgani Account
The main problem which had to be solved 
quickly was how to make effective the 
terms of the cease-fire agreed earlier.
. . . Reports continued to come in that 
the situation was still unstable (tidak 
mereda) at the Lindeteves Building near 
the Jembatan Semut and the Internatio 
Building near the Jembatan Merah. Unani­
mously the members of the Contact Bureau, 
which was in session, decided to visit 
the two places together. . . . About 
5:00 p.m.329 in a convoy of 8 cars we 
first drove to the Lindeteves Building.
It was clear that firing had ceased 
there. We quickly continued our journey 
to the Internatio Building. . . .
The Report by Capt. R. C. Smith
At approximately 1730 lavs, on 30th Octo­
ber, Capt. T. L. Laughland and I were 
ordered by Col. L. H. 0. Pugh, DSO,
2 i/c (Second-in-Command) of the Bde., 
to proceed to the Government offices, 
where we were each to collect an Indone­
sian representative. From there one of 
us was to go north, and the other south, 
through the town, and try to persuade 
the mobs to go back to their barracks. 
Brigadier Mallaby was at this time in 
conference with the Governor in the 
Government Offices.29 30
On arrival there, we were told by the 
Brigadier that the Indonesians had re­
fused to treat with anyone except him. 
Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier 
and the FSO (Field Security Officer), 
Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the 
various parties, in several cars, the 
foremost of which was flying the white 
flag.31
The first place to which we went was a 
large building about 150 yards west of 
the Kali Mas River, which runs north and 
south through the town. One Coy of 6 
Mahrattas had been having a very stiff 
fight in this building against about 
five hundred Indonesians, and had been 
in considerable difficulties.32
When the convoy of cars of the Contact 
Bureau arrived in front of the Internatio 
Building about 5:15 p.m., the firing 
stopped. Our cars were swamped (dikeru- 
muni) by dozens of our pemuda and the 
people (rakyat) who were in a highly ex­
cited state (sangat bersemangat sekali). 
They demanded that the British leadership 
in our party order the unit beleaguered 
in the building to surrender. . . .  In
29. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 47. There is a discrepancy in the time of departure 
as compared with Smith's report. Smith states that he did not leave the Brigade 
Headquarters until 1730 hrs. The convoy would then have left for the Lindeteves 
Building at approximately 1745 hrs (5:45 p.m.). Major Venu Gopal states that 
the Brigadier's convoy arrived at 4:30 p.m. Clearly he is mistaken. In the 
circumstances it is perhaps understandable that the accounts vary as to exact 
times of departure and arrival of the Contact Bureau convoy. Here the italics 
are my own.
30. It is interesting to note that Brigadier Mallaby was no longer at his Brigade 
Headquarters. He may then not have known that his brigade major and Major Harte 
had not returned from investigating a previous cease-fire violation (see above).
31. Each car was driven by an Indonesian driver.
32. Captain Smith does not mention that the party first checked the situation at the 
Lindeteves Building.
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turn Pak Dirman [Soedirman], Pak Doel 
Arnowo and Pak Sungkono stood on the bon­
nets of their cars and told the people 
milling around them that their demands 
could not be fulfilled in view of the 
agreement reached between President 
Sukarno and General Hawthorn that morn­
ing. We asked the people to be patient. 
We explained that the British units were 
to be allowed to stay inside the Interna- 
tio Building that night and would not 
leave it. They would be transported to 
the docks under TKR escort the next 
morning. The explanations of Pak Dirman, 
Tjak Doel and Pak Sungkono were accepted 
grudgingly. With that the Contact Bureau 
convoy continued its journey in the 
direction of the Jembatan Merah. Sudden­
ly from the road junction between the 
Internatio Building and the Telephone 
Building came another group of pemuda and 
people [rakyat] led by a person who ap­
peared to be in a hysterical state. He 
carried the Red and White flag. . . .  He 
explained to me proudly that the red 
coloring was the blood of a British sol­
dier! This new group stopped the Contact 
Bureau convoy for the second time. They 
issued the same demands as the first 
group. That is, that the British unit 
besieged in the Internatio Building be 
ordered to surrender forthwith, or be 
transported immediately that evening to 
the docks leaving their arms behind.
They said that as long as the British 
troops remained in the building, the 
people around it would not feel safe and 
they would continue to feel threatened, 
because several times the British unit 
had fired wildly in the direction of our 
people. We were forced to halt again.
And we all got out of the cars. Pak Dir­
man, Pak Doel Arnowo and Pak Sungkono re­
peated their explanations as to why these 
demands could not be met. And again we 
asked the people to remain calm. The 
tension abated somewhat but then they re­
quested a guarantee that the British unit 
would not open fire again that night. 
’’Right,1’ we said. After discussion with 
General Mallaby and his staff, General 
Mallaby himself said he was prepared to 
enter the building and give this order to
On our arrival there, the mob was col­
lected round the cars, and the various 
party leaders made speeches to them, in 
at attempt to persuade them to return to 
their barracks. The speeches were at 
first quite well received, and the nec­
essary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for 
the next position. We had only gone 
about 100 yards when we were stopped by 
the mob approximately 20 yards from the 
Kali Mas. From then on the situation 
rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders 
began to incite the mob, and the party 
leaders gradually lost control. The mob, 
which up to that time had seemed fairly 
friendly towards us, became distinctly 
menacing: swords were waved, and pistols
pointed at us and we were left with very 
little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the 
troops in the building laid [sic] down 
their arms and marched [sic] out: they
and us [sic] were guaranteed a safe- 
conduct back to the air field. The 
Brigadier flatly refused to consider this 
proposal. After further pressure, how­
ever, Capt. Shaw, who was well known to 
some of the Indonesians through his job 
as FSO, and who had been under a con­
siderable strain since our arrival in 
Surabaya,33 agreed to the terms on his 
own responsibility. The Brigadier at 
once countermanded this: on further con­
sideration, he decided that the company 
had been in so bad a position before, 
that any further fighting would lead to 
their being wiped out. He did not be­
lieve in the safe conduct in so far as 
it applied to us, but thought that some 
at least of the Company might get away. 
Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the 
building to give the necessary orders.34
33. This is a very significant comment. See note 54 below.
34. This vacillation on the part of Brigadier Mallaby is perhaps indicative of his 
state of mind at the time. It is clear now that his last order to Captain Shaw 
was that the personnel of ”D” Coy should lay down their arms and come out un­
armed, in hope of a safe-conduct.
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his unit. Frankly we felt apprehensive 
about General Mallaby, especially if he 
was accompanied by his staff, entering 
the building without us. Because a situ­
ation would then arise where there would 
be no British leaders outside the build­
ing but just we [Indonesians]. The pres­
ence of General Mallaby with us outside 
the building acted as a sort of brake on 
the British unit inside the building from 
fiting upon us. Because from behind the 
smashed windows and the lattice work of 
the building we could clearly see how 
their guns were trained on us!1 Frankly 
we required General Mallaby as a hostage! 
That was the reason we agreed that Captain 
Shaw only would enter the building. This 
was in accordance with the pressure of 
the crowd, some of whom shouted: "Not
the old one, Pak, but order the young 
ones only to enter." Those whom they 
meant by the "young ones," were members 
of his [Mallaby1s] staff. After Captain 
Shaw got out of the car, there remained 
in the car besides General Mallaby, Cap­
tain Smith and Captain Laughland. As 
well as Captain Shaw, we requested that 
Pak Muhammad [an officer of the TKR] 
accompany Shaw into the building. And to 
facilitate discussions inside the build­
ing we requested that Saudara Kundan [an 
Indian resident of Surabaya who acted as 
"official interpreter" for the Contact 
Bureau] should accompany them as inter­
preter. Thus three people entered the 
building as representatives of the Con­
tact Bureau, that is Captain Shaw, Pak 
Muhammad and Sdr. Kundan. We ordered 
them not to stay long in the building. . . .
With the exception of Pak Muhammad1s car, 
the convoy turned right and slowly drove 
in the direction of the Jembatan Merah. 
There we halted a moment to await the re­
turn of the deputation from the Intema- 
tio Building. After almost ten minutes 
had passed, we saw Saudara Kundan emerge 
from the door of the building, but he was 
alone. He had just got outside the door 
and shouted to us that Captain Shaw and 
Pak Muhammad required a few more minutes, 
when I saw a grenade explosion in front 
of the building from a grenade which had 
clearly been thrown from inside the 
building by the British unit, followed by 
a volley of fire from the basement and
The rest of us were disarmed— except for 
a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed 
to keep concealed--and made to sit in 
one of the cars.35
The Brigadier was on the side nearest 
to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the 
middle, and myself on the outside nearest 
to the building in which our troops were.
When Captain Shaw got into the building, 
the Indonesians brought up a machine gun 
to cover the entrance. He and the com­
pany commander decided that any attempt 
to walk out unarmed would lead to a mas­
sacre and so the order to open fire was 
given.36
35. In fact it was Soedirman's car. See Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 47.
36. This implies an agreement between Captain Shaw and Major Venu Gopal. But see 
Venu Gopal’s statement below.
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the upper storeys aimed at all of us who 
were dispersed in the triangular area [of 
the square] and at the roads in front of
the building, also at the Contact Bureau 
3 7convoy. . . .
I saw clearly that those who commenced 
firing were the British and not our 
people.37 8
It is certain that this sudden burst of 
fire caused many casualties among the 
crowd and to our pemuda. I saw several 
sprawled on the ground dead or severely 
wounded. In the middle of the chaos and 
confusion in which there was a danger we 
could be killed, we scattered and sought 
shelter individually. Pak Sungkono, Tjak 
Doel Arnowo, Dr. Mursito (son-in-law of 
Pak Dirman) Kusnandar and I, crouching to 
avoid the bullets, jumped straight into 
the Kali Mas and sheltered beside its 
banks. A moment later we were followed 
by several pemuda and other people whom 
we did not know, some among them bleeding 
from wounds from British bullets. . . . 
The firing from the building increased in 
intensity and also the retaliatory fire 
from our people and pemuda. . . .
Meanwhile there were several other pemuda 
who were able to escape from the British 
fire. One of them jumped to the edge of 
the Kali Mas near us, then whispered to 
us:
,,Itfs been fixed, Pak [Sudah beres^ 
Pak]."
"What’s been fixed?11 asked Tjak Doel 
Arnowo.
"The British General, Pak. His car 
has exploded and has been burnt out."
"Who blew it up?" we asked straight­
away.
"Don’t know. There was a grenade 
which exploded in the car, but there 
were some people from our side who 
fired at the car," continued the 
pemuda.
We were rather stunned [agak kaget] at 
hearing the pemudafs story and we in­
structed him:
As soon as the firing started, the three 
of us who were in the car crouched down 
on the floor as far as possible.
An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s 
window with a rifle. He fired four shots 
at the three of us, all of which missed. 
He then went away while we shammed dead. 
The battle went on for about two and a 
half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which 
time it was dark. At the end of that 
time, the firing died down to some ex­
tent, and we could hear shouting as 
though the Indonesians were being col­
lected. Two of them came up to the car 
and attempted to drive it away. That 
failed and one of them opened the back 
door on the Brigadier’s side.
The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from 
that that he was still alive, he spoke to 
them and asked to be taken to one of the 
party leaders. The two Indonesians went 
away to discuss this, and one of them 
came back to the front door on the Briga­
dier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him 
again, the Indonesian answered, and then
37. Abdulgani therefore categorically states that the troops of "D” Coy fired on the 
convoy, which was about 100 yards away from the building. Compare Major Venu 
Gopal’s statement below.
38. This in fact is confirmed by Smith’s report and Venu Gopal’s statement.
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"Not a word. Don't tell this story to 
anyone else!"
Indeed, a moment before the pemuda had 
jumped to the edge of the Kali Mas where 
we were sheltering, we all heard an ex­
plosion and firing near us, that is, from 
the direction of the Contact Bureau con­
voy which was about 5 metres from where 
we were taking cover.39
[Abdulgani then goes on to relate that 
the voice of Bung Tomo was heard over the 
radio "in the darkness and whizzing of 
bullets." He puts the time at 6:30 or 
later. (Surely it must have been later? 
Smith states that the firing went on for 
over two hours.)
Abdulgani then describes how he waded to 
safety together with Sungkono, Dr. Mur- 
sito, Kusnandar and Doel Arnowo.]40 *42
suddenly reached his hand in through the 
front window, and shot the Brigadier.
It took from fifteen seconds to half-a- 
minute for the Brigadier to die, but from 
the noise he made at the end, there was 
abolutely no doubt that he was dead.4 - 
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian 
ducked down beside the car, and remained 
there until after the Brigadier was dead. 
I took the pin out of the grenade which 
Capt. Laughland had previously passed to 
me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared 
again, and fired another shot which 
grazed Capt. Laughlandfs shoulder. I let 
go the lever of the grenade, held it for 
two seconds to make sure it was not re­
turned and threw it out of the open door 
by the Brigadier's body. As soon as it 
had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went 
out of the door on my side of the car, 
waited for a short time, then ran around 
the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As 
the two Indonesians by the side of the 
car did not attempt to interfere with 
us it is presumed that they were killed 
by the grenade--which also set the back 
seat of the car on fire. After five 
hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to 
reach our troops in the Dock area.
The Statements of Kundan,
Muhammad and Major Venu Gopal
In Article 8 of his series, Abdulgani gives an account of inter­
views he had with Kundan and Muhammad.112
Kundan stated that while he was standing close to Brigadier Malla- 
by's car he himself heard Brigadier Mallaby order Captain Shaw to go 
into the building, wait ten minutes, and if the crowd in front of the 
building could not be calmed down, they ("D" Coy) were to open fire. 
Kundan "remembers the reaction" of Captain Shaw, who said this would be 
very dangerous for Brigadier Mallaby himself but that the brigadier 
considered that, as a military officer, he could not accept the surren­
der terms of the Indonesians. This version is contradicted by Captain 
Smith. In a letter to me (dated February 20, 1974) he wrote:
I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian inter­
preter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard 
everything that happened, I think I should have remembered this, if
39. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, pp. 47-53. 40. Ibid., p. 54.
41. This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier
Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following 
explanation: "In the report made by Capt. Laughland and myself the following
morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in 
order to spare the feelings of his family."
42. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, pp. 58-63.
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not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report.
However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my 
attention was distracted from the Brigadier himself. For instance,
I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry 
young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his 
brother!s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very 
closely grouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a 
very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly 
able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, 
which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, 
he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least 
might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were 
that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come 
out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct [my italics].
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be 
ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed.
The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my 
memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he 
had got into the building.113
Reverting to Abdulgani's account, he then relates what Pak Muhammad 
told him regarding the events inside the Internatio Building.
When we stepped through the door of the building we had to sur­
render our pistols to the guard, who was fully armed; then we fol­
lowed Captain Shaw up to the second story. Arriving there, we were 
invited to wait outside the open door of what appeared to be the 
office of the [unit] commander. We saw Captain Shaw quickly get into 
telephonic communication with their headquarters in Jalan Westerbui- 
tenweg at Tanjung Perak and, not long after, we saw a mortar set up 
in front of the room with the open door. After ten minutes had al­
most elapsed, Saudara Kundan whispered to me that he did not trust 
their suspicious f,goings on" {ia tidak mempercayai gerak-gerik mereka 
yang mencurigakan) and he straight-away left the waiting room. In 
fact I stood up, with the intention of following Sdr. Kundan, but two 
Indian soldiers43 4 squatted in front of me and motioned me to remain 
seated. I realized that I had become a prisoner. As the door of the 
room remained open, I guessed that the mortar bombs were aimed at the 
convoy near the Jembatan Merah, possibly with the intention of caus­
ing panic among the people when that target was hit, thus giving 
Mallaby the opportunity of escaping. It was clear that my guess was 
correct because Bapak Residen Soedirman's car was burnt out.45 The 
fire from the building was answered by a fusillade from dozens of 
firearms outside the building. . . . About 10 p.m. I heard orders 
from the loudspeakers for a cessation of hostilities. Not long after 
this announcement, Captain Shaw met me and told me that General Mal­
laby had been killed by the people while his other comrades had 
managed to make their escape. He added that the death of Mallaby
43. But see statement by Major Venu Gopal below.
44. Like most Indonesian commentators, Muhammad mistakenly refers to the soldiers as 
Gurkhas. See Appendix regarding this error of nomenclature.
45. With all due respect to Muhammad, I think he is guessing incorrectly here. He
did not see Soedirman's car destroyed by a mortar bomb, because we know that 
Residen Soedirman's car was the one in which Brigadier Mallaby and his two liai­
son officers were crouching. Our authority for this is Abdulgani who states in 
Article 7: ’’Was it someone from our side who shot him [Mallaby] while he was in
Pak Dirman’s grey Lincoln which we had allocated to him?” (Seratus Hari, p. 47). 
We also know this car was damaged by the grenade thrown by Captain Smith.
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would certainly be avenged by the British military with all the 
force at their command, that is on land, sea and air.
The next day about 1 p.m. the complete Indian unit stationed at 
the Internatio Building vacated the building and was transported in 
TKR trucks to the British Headquarters at Jalan Westerbuitenweg and 
one hour later we were able to leave our detention room to a moving 
welcome from the crowd outside. . . .46 78
So, what did happen in the Internatio Building after the entry of 
Captain Shaw, Kundan and Muhammad? From Muhammad’s statement it is 
clear that, from the moment he stepped into the Internatio Building, 
he did not see much of the ensuing action. Kundan had left the build­
ing and the firing which broke out prevented him from returning. U n ­
fortunately, it has not yet been possible to contact that enigmatic 
figure, Captain Shaw, but I have finally been able to obtain evidence 
from the other key figure, the company commander of "D" Company 6 Mah- 
ratta--besieged in the Internatio Bank Building. He was a k ing’s 
commissioned officer (see Appendix for a brief explanation of Indian 
Army ranks) named Major K. Venu Gopal. In a letter to me (dated August 
8, 1974) he stated:
Let me first give you some background. ”DM Coy had been under 
fire off and on and had already had casualties. The firing came 
from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to 
contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the 
exits from the square. The previous day I had been to Battalion HQ 
for a conference but then fighting broke out again and I was stranded 
until I rejoined the Company at night during one of the so-called 
truces. I call it so-called because on return to the Bank building 
I discovered that I could not withdraw a section of mine posted in 
the Jail nearby. In fact they were imprisoned and later murdered.
Regarding the 4:30 p.m. visit I shall give below what I remember of 
the scene which remains fairly vividly etched in my memory.
When Brig. Mallaby (BM) left after his first visit armed Indone­
sians again started massing in the square. We already knew that the 
surrounding buildings were manned and our position was getting worse 
as armed men were coming very near the building. When BM returned 
at 4:30 p.m.47 the situation was almost out of control. A few Indo­
nesians (I presume local leaders) surrounded BM and they had to push 
through the crowd to get him near the Bank Building and he once again 
told me48 that there was a chance for the truce being extended.
After he said this 2 or 3 Indonesians made speeches but I could see 
that the crowd was not going to listen to speeches for long. Mean­
while BM was being hustled away from the speakers and eventually 
they too had to stop talking and they were being hustled away in 
another direction.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the Veranda of the 
building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they 
started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see BM 
or the LOs [Liaison Officers] because of the crowds on the veranda.
46. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
47. Regarding time of Brigadier Mallaby’s second visit to the Bank Building, see 
note 29 above.
48. In fact the brigadier, hemmed in by the crowd, could only convey his orders by 
shouting them across a distance of ten yards (Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, p. 
60).
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Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan (I did not know their names at that 
time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then 
shouted to the crowd that he would get us to surrender and he and 
Capt. Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an 
Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for 
time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving 
Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian officer behind. **9
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left 
with no option but to open fire. The decision was mine and mine 
alone. [These words are underlined by Major Venu Gopal in his let­
ter.] Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM did not give any 
orders to Capt. Shaw.49 50
We soon cleared the square and just as the last people were run­
ning away we could hear shots being fired into a car (presumably the 
BMfs car). BM most certainly was not killed by our firing because 
we stopped as soon as we cleared the armed mob from the veranda and 
the immediate vicinity of the building. . . .
Before commenting on the foregoing statements, two further versions 
of the incident will be outlined in brief.
On November 1, 1945, over the signature of Doel Arnowo, a document 
entitled ’’Announcement of the Surabaya Contact Bureau” was published.
In the final paragraph, the conclusion was reached that:
If in fact Brigadier Mallaby is dead it cannot be ascertained for 
certain whether his death was caused by firing from the crowd or 
from Gurkha [sio\ fire. However it is clear that if he is dead it 
happened in the course of a disturbance caused by firing first start­
ed by the Gurkhas. In this disturbance the other members of the 
Contact Bureau who were in the square bore the same risk. . . .51
On February 20 , 1946, the Labour Member of Parliament Mr. Tom Dri- 
berg stated in the House of Commons:
. . . some of the press reports from Indonesia have not been entirely 
responsible. In particular, I have learned from officers who have 
recently returned that some of the stories which have been told, not 
only in the newspapers, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government 
Front Bench in his House, have been very far from accurate and have 
unnecessarily imparted prejudice and blackened the character of the 
Indonesians. One story in particular concerns the lamented death of 
Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and 
we accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were pres­
ent when it happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear
49. This tallies with Muhammad’s account. See above.
50. By this, presumably Major Venu Gopal means that Captain Shaw did not relay any 
order to fire from Brigadier Mallaby. In fact as we have seen from the Smith 
report, Captain Shaw’s orders were to tell Major Venu Gopal to lay down his 
arms. This order apparently was not passed on, or if it was, it was ignored. 
According to Muhammad’s account, Captain Shaw went straight to the telephone 
to contact base headquarters at Tanjung Perak.
51. Doel Arnowo, in an interview with Anderson (August 13, 1962) said he was con­
vinced that Mallaby had been accidentally shot by his own men. (Anderson, 
Java, pp. 162-63, n. 87.)
103
that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was honourably killed in 
action. . . ,52
Mr. Driberg continued:
The incident was somewhat confused--as such incidents are--but it 
took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been dis­
cussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indone- 
sians--a mob if you like--had gathered in the square and were in a 
rather excited state. About 20 Indians, in a building on the other 
side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication 
and did not know about the truce.53 They were firing sporadically 
on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked 
straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the In­
dians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, 
the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at 
a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire 
again. They opened fire with two Bren guns and the mob dispersed and 
went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is 
apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire 
again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty 
minutes to half an hour after that, he was most unfortunately killed 
in his car--although even now it is not absolutely certain whether 
he was killed by Indonesians or by a grenade thrown by an Indian 
officer at some Indonesians who were approaching his car; which ex­
ploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to a charge of foul murder . . . be­
cause my information came absolutely at first hand from a British 
officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides 
I have no reason to question. . . .54
* * *
In Article 7 of his series, Abdulgani wrote that ,fThe fact is that 
General Mallaby was killed during an exchange of fire between the two 
sides. Only how he was killed and by whom is veiled in the mists of 
history. . . ,**55 In this section of the paper I hope to draw aside 
the veil and give the answers to the three questions posed at the start.
52. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, CDXIX (1945-46), cols. 1213-15.
53. But compare Muhammad*s statement, in which he said Captain Shaw telephoned base 
headquarters from the building.
54. As there were only four British officers there, who was Mr. Driberg*s informant
**actually on the spot at the moment*'? It could hardly have been Brigadier Malla­
by. It was not Captain Smith or Captain Laughland who were in the car when the 
brigadier was shot and who submitted a joint report to that effect the next day. 
We are left with Captain Shaw. In a letter to me, dated November 23, 1973, Cap­
tain Smith wrote: "The essential fact is that the brigadier was murdered in cold
blood--without even the excuse *while attempting to escape.* I have always won­
dered who was Mr. Driberg*s informant though I suppose there was only one person 
who had any covering up to do.'1 The implication is that it was Captain Shaw, who 
may also have been suffering under a sense of grievance and strain (see Captain 
Smith*s comment on p. 96). He was posted away from the brigade to Singapore 
shortly afterwards. Abdulgani notes in Article 10: "From November 1 to 10 the
Contact Bureau met continuously. But it may be said that those attending were 
not always the ones who had been originally appointed. Especially on the English 
side. . . . Captain Shaw, my counterpart, was seldom seen. . . . "  Seratus Hari, 
p. 64.
Ibid., p. 49.55.
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Question 1. Who gave the troops of "D" Coy > 6 Mahratta, 
the order to fire on the crowd?
Abdulgani is quite sure it was Brigadier Mallaby. In Article 9 
he stated:
It is clear that it was General Mallaby who, through Captain Shaw, 
gave the order to fire on us when a period of 10 minutes had elapsed.
It is also clear that their tactic was to fire on the cars occupied 
by the Indonesian members of the Contact Bureau. In my opinion it 
was General Mallaby who was responsible for the ugly incidents affect­
ing the relationship of the Indonesian Republic and the British in 
Surabaya and also for his own death in the ensuing turmoil.56
Here a decision has to be made in the light of the statements made by 
Captain Smith, Kundan and Major Venu Gopal. Whether or not Kundan 
thought he heard Brigadier Mallaby give instructions to Shaw to relay 
orders to ”D’’ Coy to open fire is not really significant in view of 
Major Venu Gopalfs adamant assertion that he and he alone decided upon 
the order to fire. It is also Captain Smith’s firm impression that 
Brigadier Mallaby’s last order was that the troops of "D" Coy should 
march out unarmed in the hope of obtaining a safe conduct. On the evi­
dence, I believe the answer to Question 1 is:
(a) Brigadier Mallaby did not give Captain Shaw the order 
that MDM Coy should fire on the crowd.
(b) This order was given on his own initiative by Major 
Venu Gopal.
Question 2. Who killed Brigadier Mallaby?
If the evidence of Captain Smith is accepted, it would negate Doel 
Arnowo’s conviction that Brigadier Mallaby was killed by one of his own 
men. The statements of Smith, Venu Gopal and Abdulgani all make non­
sense of the extraordinary version put forward by Mr. Driberg in the 
House of Commons.
When we compare the accounts of Abdulgani and Captain Smith, apart 
from minor discrepancies relating to times, there is a very close simi­
larity between them. It is only in the description of what happened 
after the firing started and the Indonesian members of the Contact 
Bureau made a dash for the Kali Mas, leaving behind the Brigadier and 
his two liaison officers in the grey Lincoln car, that their accounts 
diverge. However, regarding Mallaby1s final moments, Captain Smith has 
the advantage over Abdulgani in that he was an eyewitness. I submit 
that Captain Smith is a credible witness. He is not dogmatic. We may 
recall that he wrote: . . However, in all fairness, I must say that
there were moments when my attention was distracted. . . ." He also
had an acute eye for detail. Regarding the firing of four shots into 
the car before the killing of Mallaby he observed:
I have no idea what happened to the four shots from the rifleman.
He approached the car from the left (the Brigadier’s side) with the 
rifle at the ready, and looking at the three of us. I am not ashamed 
to say at this point I shut my eyes and started counting the shots!
56. Ibid., p. 58.
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I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both our­
selves and the others alive afterwards!57
On the actual murder of Mallaby, he recalled:
. . . the Indonesian who killed the Brigadier was a young lad around 
16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to see whether he was 
wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic pistol. . . .58
During his escape, swimming up the Kali Mas to the Dock area, he notes:
Certain incidents stand out in my memory of that swim--the difficulty 
of untying shoelaces while treading water--lying up in some reeds 
while the occupants of a boat a few yards from us settled down for 
the night--having to dive under a couple of corpses that were block­
ing our way. . . .
and
. . . the whole incident--and, in fact the whole of our stay in 
Sourabaya--made an indelible impression. I understand that a great 
deal of politics was mixed up in it, but as a military operation, it 
was a disaster. . . .59
After weighing the evidence I am satisfied that the answer to 
Question 2 is that Brigadier Mallaby was shot by an unidentified Indo­
nesian .
Question 3. Who^ if anyonej was to blame
for Brigadier Mallaby 9s death?
Abdulgani, representing the Indonesian viewpoint, quite clearly 
lays the blame on Mallaby himself. The official British viewpoint, as 
expressed in the Mansergh Report, is that: "Brigadier Mallaby was m u r ­
dered in cold blood after being deserted by the Indonesian members of 
the Contact Bureau, when trying to implement the terms of a cease-fire 
previously agreed to by both sides." This latter verdict appears to me 
to beg the question: "Why was Brigadier Mallaby in the Internatio
Square in the first place?" In my opinion he should never have placed 
himself in such a compromising situation. The role of a senior com­
mander is to give cool, reasoned leadership, not to go dashing off and 
involve oneself in direct confrontations with armed mobs. It seems 
clear that at that time Mallaby was a very shaken man. The 49 Brigade had 
been his first active command and his handling of the brigade in Sura.- 
baya had resulted in a shambles. It is of course easy to criticize 
this gallant officer in the light of hindsight, and I do not suggest 
that all the blame for the disaster should be placed on him.60 However, 
Brigadier Mallaby was ultimately responsible for the actions of those
57. Letter dated November .23, 1973.
58. Letter dated February 20, 1974. 59. Ibid.
60. It was of course a "disaster" only from the British point of view. The Indone­
sians regarded it as a victory. See the opening paragraphs of the famous short 
story "Surabaja" by Idrus: "People were drunk with victory. Everything had ex­
ceeded their dreams and expectations . . . "  in the anthology Gema Tanah Air 
(Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1959), p. 306. This story has been translated into
English by S. U. Nababan and Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, and published in Indone­
sia, 5 (April 1968), pp. 1-28.
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under his command and about 6:30 p.m. on the night of October 30, 1945, 
while he was still negotiating with the Indonesian members of the Con­
tact Bureau, Major Venu Gopal ordered the men of "D" Coy to fire on the 
crowd. From that moment on Brigadier Mallaby's life was forfeit. In 
the circumstances the only answer that can be given to Question 3 is 
that Brigadier Mallaby was himself responsible for the situation that 
resulted in his death.
* * *
Even to those unversed in the exercise of military command, it 
would appear at first sight that Mallaby made a number of elementary 
errors:
1. He dispersed his troops in Mpenny packets1’ all over the town 
without securing his lines of communication.
2. He completely underestimated the leadership, strength and 
fighting spirit of the Indonesians.
3. It took him too long to appreciate the potential danger to 
his dispersed troops, who carried no reserves of ammunition.
(We have it on the authority of Wehl that even as late as the 
afternoon of Sunday, October 28, there were still soldiers 
wandering about Surabaya on sight-seeing and shopping trips!)
In his letter of November 23, 1973, Captain Smith observed:
. . . Brigadier Mallaby had wanted to mount the operation in the 
normal way--establish a bridge-head, and then gradually go through 
the town with our lines of communication secured. Instead we were 
ordered to guard various--admittedly important--areas such as the 
power station, the waterworks and so on. This involved splitting up 
the brigade, so that when the trouble started these odd sections and 
platoons were mopped up with great ease by the Indonesians. . . .
If this statement is accepted it throws a very different light on M a l ­
laby’ s performance and on the conduct of operations by Headquarters 23 
Division. The staff of 23 Division was also responsible for that major 
error of judgment--the leaflet-dropping raid on October 27--when nego­
tiations between Mustopo and Mallaby were at a delicate stage. Then 
there was the ignorance of the real situation in Surabaya. This appal­
ling lack of effective intelligence permeated the whole of South East 
Asia Command from its headquarters in Singapore down to the lowest for-- 
mations. Colonel Doulton, who said that ’’Brigadier Mallaby walked into 
a hornet’s nest unawares,” was himself a senior staff officer of the 
formation directing the 49 Brigade operation!
It is clear, therefore, that the full story behind 49 Brigade’s 
’’failure" is yet to be told. However, from the evidence available, it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Brigadier Mallaby’s superiors, 
particularly the staff of 23 Division and perhaps even more senior com­
manders in Batavia and Singapore, must bear a substantial part of the 
blame for the 49 Brigade debacle.
In some ways death may have come as a merciful relief for the u n ­
lucky Mallaby. One wonders what his thoughts were as he lay crouched 
in the back of Soedirman’s Lincoln sedan. What a squalid end to a 
brilliant career. Up to 1945 all had been success for this intelligent, 
urbane officer. He had been an adviser to Mountbatten, a major general
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at 42--he appeared destined to reach the highest ranks in his profes­
sion. After the 49 Brigade disaster, his career would have been fin­
ished. He would almost certainly have had to face a Court of Enquiry, 
and might even have been court-martialed for incompetence. The British 
Army rarely tolerates failure; when it occurs, scapegoats have to be 
found. Many survivors of the initial Surabaya fighting still feel bit­
ter over the treatment they received from the army establishment. 
Colonel Doulton commented:
5th Indian Division rightly received a notable message of congratu­
lations from the C-in-C A.L.F.S.E.A. [Allies Land Forces South East 
Asia] at the end of their task, but some felt that 49 Bde should 
also have been honoured. In the long and glorious history of the 
Indian Army, there can have been few battles where the odds were 
greater and few that gave finer proof of the loyalty, discipline, 
courage and endurance of the Indian soldier. . . .61
He also wrote that
In the eyes of the Army the fact that 5th Indian Division had come 
in was taken to represent failure on the part of 49 Brigade and 23 
Division. It’s a hard world!62
General Pugh (former Second-in-Command 49 Brigade) has also told me 
how shabbily he was treated after the Surabaya Affair, but has re­
quested that the details be not published.63
Brigadier Mallaby’s body was returned to the British by Dr. Sugiri 
on the morning of November 8, 1945. Apparently Mallaby’s body had 
been taken to the General Hospital where it had been in Dr. Sugiri’s 
care.64 He was buried on the same day at the edge of the airfield. 
Present at the funeral were Vice-Admiral Patterson, representing the 
Commander-in-Chief, A.L.F.S.E.A., and Major General Mansergh, command­
ing 5th Indian Division,65 which was shortly to advance on and take 
Surabaya. According to Abdulgani, Mallaby’s body was subsequently 
transferred by the Dutch to the Kembang Kuning Dutch War Cemetery, 
British Commonwealth Section, grave 13, Plot row 2-A.66 From there 
the brigadier’s remains were transferred to the War Cemetery at Menteng 
Pulo, Jakarta, in grave location VG2. The headstone reads:
Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby, CIE, OBE.
2nd PUNJAB REGIMENT 
30th OCTOBER 1945, AGE 45.
MMORE BRAVE FOR THIS 
THAT HE HATH MUCH TO L0VEM
61. Doulton, The Fighting Cock, p. 266.
62. Letter to writer, August 4, 1973.
63. Letter to writer, August 7, 1973.
64. It is perhaps ironic that Mallaby*s body was returned by Dr. Sugiri who was the 
first Indonesian to make contact with the British on the evening of October 25. 
Colonel Pugh described the Sugiri party’s Japanese-type uniforms and accoutre­
ments and Mthe way they bowed and hissed through their teeth in the Japanese 
manner” (Pugh, ”Soerabaja,” p. 324). See also p. 92 above, under Thursday, 
October 25, p.m.
65. War Diary 49th Indian Infantry Brigade.
66. Abdulgani, Seratus Hari, p. 66.
Soetomo (Bung Tomo) delivering a radio address 
in Surabaya, October 1945 (Photo: Ipphos)
Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby (from a portrait by Walter Stoneman; 
Illustrated London News, CCVII, 5560 [Nov. 10, 1945], p. 506)
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Appendix
Note on the Composition of 49th 
Indian Infantry Brigade Group
The Allied Force which arrived in Surabaya on October 25, 1945, 
was in fact the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade Group. Although this for­
mation is often referred to as British Forces, the bulk of the sol­
diers were regular troops of the Indian Army under the command of 
British and Indian officers. Subunits below company level were com­
manded by Indian Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and Indian Non- 
Commissioned Officers (NCOs). There were a few British NCOs with units 
of the supporting arms (Signals, Transport and Workshops, etc.). There 
were a small number of Indian King's Commissioned Officers (KCOs) whose 
status was equivalent to that of their British counterparts. (One 
such KCO was Major K. Venu Gopal, commanding "D" Company, 6 Mahratta 
in the Internatio Bank Building between October 28 and 30, 1945.)
In most accounts of the Surabaya Affair, the troops of 49 Brigade 
are referred to as Gurkhas.67 Gurkha regiments have a well-earned 
reputation as first-class infantry with the Indian and British Armies. 
But there were no Gurkha units with 49 Bde. (See the attached Order 
of Battle.) Gurkha infantry first made their appearance in Surabaya 
on November 10, 1945, as part of 123 Indian Infantry Brigade of 5th 
Indian Division, and took part in the initial advance on the city.
The infantry of 49 Bde (on whom the main burden of the fighting 
fell) consisted of two battalions of Mahrattas and one battalion of 
Rajputs. The Mahratta Regiment draws its men from the area around 
Bombay while the Rajputana Rifles' recruiting area is in the state of 
Rajputana to the north. Both of these groups have strong martial tradi­
tions. There is no doubt that they strongly upheld their traditions 
in desperate fighting against overwhelming odds during the period 
October 28-30, 1945. Specifically, the battalions involved were 4th 
Battalion, the Mahratta Light Infantry (4 Mahratta); 6th Battalion, 
the Mahratta Light Infantry (6 Mahratta); 5th Battalion, Rajputana 
Rifles (5 Raj Rif). The locations of these battalions are shown on 
the map above. Each battalion would have numbered about 700-800 men, 
organized into 4 rifle companies and a headquarters company. Each com­
pany consisted of 3 platoons and a company headquarters. A platoon 
numbered about 30 men subdivided into sections of 10 under the command 
of a Naik or Lance-Naik (equivalent to the British Army ranks of cor­
poral or lance-corporal). Much of the October fighting in Surabaya was 
at the platoon and section level, thus putting a premium on the morale 
discipline and on the leadership of junior NCOs. In the Darmo area to 
the south of the town, the main burden of the fighting in defense of 
the Darmo Hospital and Internment Camp area (where most of the Dutch 
women and children internees were concentrated) fell on the men of the 
5 Raj Rif and the 3rd Indian Field Artillery Regiment, the latter under 
the command of Lt. Colonel Rendall. Col. Rendall was able to site many 
of the regiment's twenty-four field guns which fired over open sights 
at selected targets and caused much havoc among the attacking Indone­
sian forces. Once this concentration of infantry and artillery had 
been effected the Darmo area was never in any real danger of being 
overrun.
67. For example, see Abdulgani, Seratus Hari; Anderson, Java, p. 159; Moestopo, 
"Rahasia Kesaktian 'Bambu Runcing' Dapat Mengalahkan Senjata2 Modern Jepang 
Dizaman Revolusi 1945," Variasi, 39 (August 16, 1974), pp. 20, 32-33; and 
others.
Outline Order of Battle of 49th Indian Infantry Brigade Group, October 25-30, 1945
Headquarters
Commander - (Brigadier A. W. S. Mallaby)
Second in Command - (Colonel L. H. 0. Pugh)
Staff Officers
DAQMG (Administration)
Staff Captain 
Intelligence Officer 
Public Relations Officer 
Liaison Officers
INFANTRY BATTALIONS SUPPORTING ARMS, etc.
4th Battalion 
Mahratta Light 
Infantry 
(4 Mahratta)
Rifle A B C D 
Companies
Platoon 1 2  3 Coy
HQ
6th Battalion 
Mahratta Light 
Infantry 
(6 Mahratta)
HQ
Coy
Sections 1 2 3
5th Battalion 
Rajputana Rifles
(5 Raj Rif)
3 Indian Field Regt. (Artillery) 
Indian Field Coy (Engineers) 
Indian Signals 
Indian Transport Coy 
Indian Workshops
Indian Pioneer Coy (Labor Force) 
Indian Field Ambulance (Medical) 
Field Security Section
The whole Brigade complement would have numbered 
approximately 4,000 officers and men. in
